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### The United Nations and Sustainable Peace Enforcement in the Rwandan Genocide

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#### **Abstract**

*The study examined the rationale behind the conflict between two major ethnic group who shared considerable cultural similarities which would have engendered nation-building but turned out to create around for massive killings termed Rwanda Genocide. It also interrogated the narrow UNAMIR mandate which was limited to monitoring, assisting and investigating crime and violence arising from the Arusha Accord. Descriptive study method was utilized which focused on the character and actions of the personages that were involved in all actions which led to sustain and failed in halting the genocide. The 'just-war theory was the framework for evaluating the ineptitude of the UNO in halting the Genocide. The practice of Anthropometry deepened segregation between the ethnic groups. The failure of nation-building escalated by the French colonialist exacerbated. The UNO failed to act as at when due perhaps because Rwanda was not considered of strategic importance to the holder of veto powers at the UNO. It then posited the need for Peace-Enforcement rather than Peacekeeping in every situation where the UN facilitates an Accord. This is because when two or more groups are in conflict or at war, it means peace is absent. It would be a grand deception to pursue 'peace-keeping' where non-existed. Every UNO mission must have its communication radio and interpreters to avoid language problem which complicated the problem in Rwanda. There should be a sociological understanding of the problem they have gone resolve in order to be strategic in their operations by knowing hardliners who are ready to sabotage the mission.*

**Keywords:** Peace enforcement, Military Staff Council, Anthropometry, Peacekeeping, United Nations Security Council

#### **Introduction**

The point of departure in this discourse was that peace is an intangible asset which is most desired by everyone irrespective of race and nationality. Every threat to it, disrupt social equilibrium, development and human existence particularly in this period of technological

wizardry in the innovation of deadly weaponry. The global system witnessed the destruction of WW1 (1914-1918) in 1920 to maintain world peace. By 1939-1945, WWII had occurred which indicated the failure of the first attempt to maintain global peace through the instrumentality of the League of Nations (LON). The global community then came up with the UNO in 1945, and entrusted the maintenance of global peace to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as the guardian of global peace. Article 1 of the UNO charter set the framework for UNSC which have been charged with maintaining International Peace and security and to take 'effective collective measures towards the prevention and removal of threats to peace'. Consequent upon the ubiquitous threat to peace the UNO in 1956 created a force to address the 'Suez Canal crisis, First, UN Emergency Force (UNEF1) and its operation in the Congo in 1960, which took the lives of not only some soldiers but also of the UN Secretary-General Mr. Dag Hammarskjold.

The question of the study was focused on why two major ethnic groups should result into the desire to eliminate the other in a mass-killing termed Rwandan-genocide, even when they speak same language, share the same religion and other cultural attributes in what would have united them into a virile strong nation. The other flange of the problem was to evaluate why UNAMIR mandate was so narrow, and limited to 'monitoring, assisting and investigating crime and violence related to Arusha Accord rather than enforced the accord. We then sought the other aspect of the issue related to the importance of Rwanda its people and natural minerals, whether they are not of strategic interests to the permanent members of the UNSC to have generated adequate and prompt set of actions to forestall the genocide in Rwanda. This might have caused the delay in categorizing the conflict as genocide and constituting UNAMIR with broad mandate to halt the massacre and resolve the issues therein. UNAMIR Commander Romeo Dallaire only got to know the extensive power of the Hutu movement on arrival in Rwanda and the plan for mass termination of the Tutsi.

In the context of this study, this was considered a wrong strategy in a war situation. There was no peace hence the killings. This did not make room for any 'peace-keeping force' but rather 'peace-enforcement' force as proposed in this study. Furthermore, why did the principal contributor in the UNSC donate outdated weaponry of WWII to resolve a conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the age of Information Communication Technology and drone warfare? Does absence of leadership non-existence of nation building lead to the inability to inspire national consciousness among the major ethnic groups which gave rise to the genocide?

### **Objectives of the Study**

The objectives of the study are as follows:

1. To illustrate that there is often in conflict situation no peace in existence to keep , hence, the mandate should be first the creation of the template for peace enforcement.
2. To demonstrate that peace keeping should be preceded by peace Accord.
3. To establish the imperative of understanding the genesis and dynamics of the conflict by the military commanders before every intervention.

### **Significance of the Study**

The importance of this scrutiny cannot be overemphasis because about ten years after the goriest incident in human society in recent time, knowledge gap still persists. To the International Criminal Court, Rwandan and the African Union, this study stressed the point that there could

could not be ‘peace-keeping’ but ‘peace enforcement’. Whenever the UN/UNSC facilitate an Accord the UN military group should go for the enforcement of the accord because belligerent would on their own frustrate the coming to live of the accord as seen in the Rwandan case. Theoretically, it averred that it is important to know that there must be sociological study of the conflict before peace-enforcement. This is to enable the peace-enforcement group know the ‘hardliners’ who would frustrate the exercise by intrigues. It is also instructive that the current study submitted that Hutus could not be guiding the airport at the time of the shooting of the aircraft of the president and turned around to accuse the Tutsi RPF when they had accused the president of conceding too much to the RPF in the Accord. The study revealed its reasoning to all the groups related to the Rwanda conflict and its resolution.

### **Theoretical Framework of Analysis**

The Just-Theory of War. Plato (428-347 BC), Aristotle (384-322 BC) was the earliest classical philosophers who generated the ‘Just-Theory’ of war which we are adopting to explain how the situation in Rwanda would have been handled with minimal casualties. We adopted the ‘Just-War-Paradigm to connect, explain, firm-up, the thesis that the role of the UNSC ought to have been that of ‘peace enforcement rather than peace-keeping’ in Rwanda. Peace enforcement amount to a ‘just-war-paradigm. The war in this context should have been ‘agnostic war’, which is often by norms of engagement after a sociological understanding of the situation to guide the warfare. The theory debuted in the Political Thought of St. Augustine of Hippo in the 4<sup>th</sup> century, where he submitted that *the only reason to go to war was the desire for peace. Be peaceful, therefore in warring, so that you may war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace*(Frank, 2016). In this context a sociological study of every conflict would reveal the belligerent who derive gains from the conflict and would sabotage all attempts at reconciliation. The peace-enforcement team would then design a strategy to contain their excesses as the situation arises.

Augustine was followed by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) in his ‘*De Jure Belli Ac Pacis*’ which averred that *war is justifiable only if a country faces imminent danger and the use of force is both necessary and proportionate to the threat*. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), in his ‘*Summa theologiae*’ on his own part submitted three reasons to justify a just war; first, the war must be waged upon the command of a rightful sovereign. Secondly, the war needs to be waged for just cause, on account of some wrong the attacked have committed. Thirdly, warriors must have the right intent, namely to promote good and avoid evil. Consequent upon these theories, the UNSC would have identified belligerents to be removed from the scene for a broad base government to have been formed. It would have embarked on peace enforcement rather than delayed peace keepers, to enforce the Arusha agreement which would have created peace in Rwanda. This would have been an agnostic war, meant to enforced rules and norms to immobilize all those hardliners in the Hutu led-government who would not allow the full implementation of the Arusha agreement. It would have been justifiably so because it would have saved the lives of numerous Tutsis. The desire for peace and prosperity would have been the most compelling rational for the just war. This perspective was complimented with leadership framework.

Leadership according to Bernard Montgomery is the capacity and will to rally men and women to a common purpose and the character which inspires confidence (Igbuzor, 2012 p 21). We observed that in Rwanda from independence, had a leadership vacuum. A leader would have embarked on wielding the Twa, Hutus and the Tutsis together through a skilful art of nation and

state-building to generate a sense of belonging among these ethnic groups with very similar culture to give birth to Rwandan citizenship rather than indigeneship that are suspicious of each other with no common ground to cooperate together before now. The template for leadership was based on:

First, the leader having the capacity to foresee the future, as well as the road map leading to it for the benefit of all within the state, and acquiring the skills required to discharge the duties as best as possible. Second, the ability to lead from the front, to take the initiative and tell those following, this is the target, follow me to it, rather than ‘I am right behind you’. Third, the leader must give the people’s interests top priority, embody their aspirations, meet their needs and formulate equation that can achieve these goals through one or more visions with specific objectives and implementation timelines. Fourth, leader should own up failures and credit success to the team. The leader must not give precedence to him over the others because it entails sacrifice for the group. Fifth, leader must able to consult with others because no one knows where the brightest ideas may come from. Sixth, leader must have the mental and physical capacity to enable him to carry out his duties. Seventh, a leader should be the symbol of the society and a living example to the younger generation. He must set a good example for his team (Maktoum, 2015). The leaders must share the gains of the new destination equally because everyone sacrificed to get there. Attempt to exclude others generate relative deprivation and stress in the system. This was the missing link until the emergence of Paul Kagame in Rwanda.

### **Methodology of Study**

Descriptive research was considered adequate and appropriate for this study. This was because almost all materials considered relevant had already been compiled, organized and published one way or the other. The qualitative data in use here were mostly secondary and tertiary, some of which are still emerging from major actors in the ICC. The major components of these secondary materials were drawn from ‘observations, case studies and analyses of secondary materials’. It consisted of analyzing the actions of the major characters and institutions related to the conflict. Identifying how their actions would have halted or enhanced the conflict. It provided detailed representation of data collected through survey, case-study to; (i) identify the population and situation, and systematically describe from secondary sources of materials. It then stated what happened, when, where and how. (ii) It proceeded to state the frequencies of the actions of the population so identified. (iii) It combine survey, observation and case -study in obtaining its data. The essence of the design was to obtain data concerning the current status of peace-keeping force in Rwanda. It sought data to assist in decision-making (Ndiyo, 2005 p. 70), going forward in any other similar situation.

Procedurally, it entailed examining the established code against the practice and the outcomes. Does the outcome resolve the problems which the Peace-keeping Force was set up to resolve? The elements considered in the application of the methodology were; what are the principles of Peace-keeping operations enunciated by the UNSC? How were these applied in Rwandan crisis? What accounted for ethnic violence between the Hutus and the Tutsi in 1959, 1963, 1967, and 1990? Did the peace-keeping force attempt to understand the variables which accounted for this violence in order to understand the dynamics of 1994 crisis? Who were those hardliners who were not ready to cooperate with the peace-keeping squad. These were the focus of descriptive methods to generate qualitative data which were triangulated for the analysis utilized in the analysis herein.

### **UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operation**

In 1992 a formal Department of Peace-Keeping Operation (DPO) was established to be controlled by the UNSC which authorize Peace-Keeping Operation under Chapter VII of the Charter. The mandate set out the grounds that must be fulfilled before deployment. However, regional organizations could be authorized to ensure the restoration of peace where in the view of the UNSC, that direct UN involvement was unnecessary. The mandate of DPO included:

- To help countries torn by conflict to create the conditions for lasting peace.
- Stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement.
- Lead states or territories through transition to stable government.
- Security sector reform and other rule of law related activities.
- Support for the restoration and extension of state authority

### UN Peace-Keeping Principles

It was the contention of this study, that crises vitiate ‘peace’ hence peace should be restored before peace-keeping operations commence anywhere. Accordingly, the UN should create peace between belligerent’s forces before seeking to keep the peace. The term, ‘Peace-keeping’ has in recent times generated spurious conceptions requiring different approaches. It was important that we identify what it means and state what it ought to be. Consequently, we have; traditional peace keeping, preventive deployment, helping to implement and negotiate agreements, protecting delivery of humanitarian supplies, reconstruction and development and ceasefire enforcement and peace keeping (Obiozor & Ajala, 1998 p 104). We are indeed concerned with Ceasefire-and Peace-enforcement because this was what defined the Rwandan case-study, which was the focus of this study. The operational principles of the UN Peace-keepers according to record include:

- Consent of the Parties in the conflict* - It was the contention of this study that each party in the conflict operate with the ‘zero-sum’ mentality to emerge victorious hence, may delay consenting to mediation and peacekeepers would often come late while human lives get wasted. The logical situation is when a third party broker peace agreement the UN should move to implement the covenant to engender Trust which is often lacking.
- Impartiality* - The UN Peace-keeping force is expected always to be impartial. Where the UN Peace-Keeping, the ‘blue-Beret or Blue-Helmet’ is allowed to be commanded by the Chief of Army of the state in dispute as initially the case in the Rwandan-situation. The force become immobilized and skewed to the side which provided it with logistics. This principle stands impartiality on the head and exacerbated the Rwandan genocide.
- Non-use of Force* - (except in the case of self defence) - Every conflict have two main contestants with weapons in their hands. Allowing the Peace-Keeper to go between fighters without ‘enforcing peace’ was considered abnormal in this study.

The logic here was that when the parties agreed on certain terms and acceded to the United Nations Peace Keeping, the logic should be that of ‘Peace-Enforcement’ rather than ‘Peace-Keeping’ because there was no peace existing *ab-intio* to keep. The business of the Peace-keepers should be ‘compelling observance of or compliance with the obligations contained in the covenant reached at ‘stage-1-consent’ of this discourse. The peace-keepers must be armed with the most modern weaponry. but, this was not the case with UNAMIR. As it would be illustrated later the UN Peace-Keeping Operations in Rwanda (UNAMIR) placed the control of its high

command under the control of Rwanda Military Authority which was dominated by Hutus, who were interested party in the conflict. This completely rendered the military unable to observe aspects of the Arusha 1993 agreement it considered unacceptable. It would be recalled that the Hutus had blamed the negotiators of conceding too much to the RPF. Impartiality became compromised in Rwanda.

### **The Political Sociology of Rwanda**

The land of a thousand hills because of its hilly topography is an East Central African state. It is geographically situated between the Equator and the Tropic of Capricorn. A Landlocked country in the Great Rift Valley of Central Africa, where the African Great Lakes region and Southeast Africa converged. It is bordered by republic of Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and DRC. Though a landlocked country it has several lakes and speak Kinyarwanda, French and Swahili. The population consists of Hutu, Tutsis and Twa. The economy is based on banana production, potatoes, beans, cassava, wheat, maize, coffee and tea which constitute the cash crops. The mining sector is focused on cassiterite, wolframite. Rwanda was German colonial territory, but with the defeat of Germany in WWI, it became a UN Mandate territory entrusted to Belgium. Rwanda had its cradle with the Tutsi Kings who were scared of the majority Hutus. The fear translated into anti-Hutu state policies. Belgium like Germany ruled the colonial territory through the local kings, 'indirect rule' wherein the Tutsi traditional system existed.

The system excluded the Hutus majority ethnic group. In 1957 however, at the instigation of an apostolic canon Eugene Ernotte, Hutu irredentism was initiated, when the 'Banhutu Manifesto' was launched. The document sought to take over political power from the Tutsis who were minority. The document intent was to emancipate the Hutus from the Tutsis. The document sowed grave division between the Hutus and Tutsi when it declared that the two ethnic groups were separate races and requested that political power should be returned to the Hutus from the minority Tutsis. Consequent upon this, the first conflict broke out in 1959 between the two groups. Belgium the colonial master for inexplicable reason backed the Hutus against the Tutsis in the conflict. This laid the second foundation for animosity and power struggle in Rwanda along ethnic divide.

The preference of the Belgians for Hutu-in-power manifested in actions in the Peace-Keeping Force, when they unilaterally withdrew their forces and weapons from the UNAMIR, thereby empowering the Hutus in their genocide mission. The genocide was more effective because the Hutus had set up militia movements in various cells around the country on the advice of Canon Eugene Ernotte. The *impuzamugambi* (*those with the same goal*) and *Interahamwe* (*those who attack together*), slaughtered many more Tutsi like the Hutu soldiers.

In 1950s the Belgians introduced the policy of Anthropometry which used Body Mass Index (BMI), height, weight, waistline and body thickness to segregate between the Hutus and the Tutsis. This identity card policy created the 'we and they' syndrome which further deepened the animosity in Rwanda. This pushed the antagonists into independence. In 1960 Belgium organized elections into the traditional chieftaincy offices in Rwanda, a ploy to replace Tutsi chiefs with majority Hutus, which was the latent reason for the election. The Hutus assumed majority of the chieftaincy and mayoral positions in large cities in the traditional governance system in Rwanda. By 1962 when independence was granted to Rwanda, the Hutus were in the commanding height of the politics, with Gregoire Kayibanda as the first president of independent Rwanda (1962-73) and colonel Guillaume Longiest they were ring-leaders in the Hutu revolt against the Tutsi hegemony in 1959. The bitterness of 1959 became the directive principle of state policy and an ideology against the Tutsi in the post-independence Rwanda. The Tutsi

refugees who had moved into Uganda and other states then constituted themselves in Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), launching attacks in Rwanda for attention. In the process, many Hutus were displaced from the North which were recruited into the civilian militias.

In 1990, the RPF (exiled Rwandan desirous to return home) led by Major General Fred Gisa Rwigyema led RPF into Rwanda against the Hutu led Government and the civil war commenced. By 1994, they halted the militia killings and overran the Hutu led government in Rwanda. In the process over 800,000 Tutsi were murdered in what was referred to as the Rwandan genocide. The gory modes of killings in the genocide were considered outside the frame of this study. This study was divided into several sections to place the issues discussed in their proper context. Section 1, examined the imperative of the UN Peace-keeping Department and its operational principles and the imperative of changing the strategies. The political sociology of Rwanda and the emergence of Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). Section 2 examined the objectives of the study, raised research questions, state the research problem, the methodology of study, and the theoretical framework upon which the analysis rested. Section 3, then presented data and evaluated each of the research questions earlier raised in section 2. The section then concluded the study with critical suggestions to place UN Security Council and its Military Staff Council in a position to obtain data about the conflict in any state before deployment of booths on the ground in any state.

### **The UNSC and Rwandan Genocide**

The UN charter, Article 39 enjoined the UNSC to *inter alia* ...determine the existence of any threat to international peace, breach of the peace...decide what measures are in consonance with Article 41 and 42 and use appropriate measures to nip it in the bud. The article did not however define the barometer for the determination of any threat to peace of international dimension and the appropriate actions required thereafter. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) consists of the chief of Army of the member state of the UNSC and other co-opted members. The MSC has the duty to advice and convince the UNSC of the appropriate form of actions to be taken. UNSC then authorize such steps through the office of the Secretary-General of the UNO. It was through this process that the Arusha-Talks was initiated and should have been enforced since it was UN initiated.

### **The Arusha Accord**

It was from the initiative of the MSC that the Arusha Peace Talk was initiated between the Hutu dominated government of Rwanda and the Tutsis refugees constituting the RPF. Some of the agreement reached included included: i) The establishment of a Broad based Government (BBGT) consisting of Hutus and the Tutsis; ii) Incumbent Head of the Government was to remain the Head of the Government etc. However, as soon as the the Hutu head of the government was sworn-in under the terms of the Arusha accord, Hutu hardliners in the government frustrated all attempt to consummate the accord and bring the Tutsis into the interim government. Consequently, the Transitional Government was not sworn in which would have had both Hutus and Tutsis working together towards peace. UNAMIR was set up to monitor that execution of the Arusha Accord. In that spirit, it escorted RPF officials in an outing, they were ambushed and executed. The confidence building collapsed.

On the 6<sup>th</sup> April 1994, the aircraft conveying the Rwanda interim President and that of Burundi was shot down killing all on board in an airport under the guard of Rwandan Hutu government. The presidential guard immediately started killing Tutsis on the suspicion that the RPF were responsible for shooting down the plane. It was clear that hard line Hutus had resented

the president for giving-in too much to the RPF in the Arusha agreement. On the 8<sup>th</sup> April 1994, the RPF launched its own attack aimed at halting the killings of its people. The aftermath of all these amounted to the genocide.

### **Data Presentation: Affirmation of Research Questions**

In the preceding narrative, we posited that the leadership vacuum in 'pre - and post independent Rwanda accounted for the genocide. We proceed to affirm this postulation serially:

- a) The Belgian took over Rwanda (Rwanda-Urundi) with the Tutsi monarchical rule about 1918 from the League of Nations (LON) as a mandate territory from Germany. By 1950, the Belgians introduced and practiced the policy of using the physical features and Body Mass Index to issue identity cards in the colony. This was known sociologically as 'Anthropometry'.

In 1957 the 'Bantu Manifesto (Emancipation Movement) was launched which sought to transfer political power to the Hutus majority. By 1960, the Belgians transferred political power to the Hutus through local government elections. The above data indicated that no one assume the role of a leader in the pre-colonial era. The cumulative effect of all these pre-independence activities was to create a 'we and they' syndrome between the two major ethnic groups even when they share several social norms together. The church which they all belonged played divisive rather than cohesive role. They became sworn enemies with extreme dislike for each other. The post-independence situation also indicated leadership gap in Rwanda. It gained independence in 1962 with Gregoire Kayibanda as the President. This put the Tutsis in a disadvantage disposition, because he was one of the ring-leaders of the Hutu revolt against the Tutsis in 1959. The animosity was now elevated to the level of governance, directive principles of state policy. By 1963, came unmitigated marginalization of the Tutsis in the post-independent Rwanda. The excessive 'relative deprivation' suffered by the Tutsis resulted in a rebellion, which the Hutu government quelled. Many Tutsis escaped into neighbouring countries.

The analytic thinking of the above indicated the post-independent head of government never exhibited leadership. There was no vision of a united Rwandan state. There was no attempt at harnessing both the human and material resources for the benefit of all. The Tutsis were rather regarded as migrants. Hate speeches against the Tutsis were allowed. The enmity grew and laid the foundation for the eventual genocide. The Aftermath of civil war: After taking over Rwanda, the RPF showed leadership through a government of national unity which was headed by a Hutu (Pasteur Bizimungu), while Paul Kagame became Vice President and Minister of Defence. This government collapsed because the Hutu -head of government resigned owing to a number of factors. He was termed a 'sell-out' by hardline Hutus. The distrust did not allow a confidence building measure. It is important to note that since 1994, Paul Kagame have been providing leadership in Rwanda. It is expected that his leadership would generate 'national consciousness or shared sense of national value or identity. A sense of common cultural, linguistic commonality should lead to unity and not a mechanical one. The events in Rwanda currently indicate that the State is in the right direction of statehood.

- b) The UNSC is the organ charged with the maintenance of global peace and addressing all threats to global peace. We ruminated on the Rwandan situation and asked if it qualified as a threat to global peace? We were moved to raise this question because of the time it took the UNSC to authorize UNAMIR I and II and its scope of operation. We were forced to further ask because of the quality of weaponry contributed by members of the UNSC which consisted



mainly of the relics of WWII weapons abandoned and stockpiled in NATO armament store in Italy, which had become mere irons (Melven, 1996). We further meditated whether 'Rwanda a landlocked' country could have been considered to be of less strategic importance to warrant early comprehensive peace enforcement rather than peace-keeping.

It took the UNO 20 years afterwards before the UNSC in its 7155<sup>th</sup> meeting to review and frown at its failure in the Rwandan situation (SC/11356, 16 April 2014). What was the response time in Serbia and Kosovo? We then asked if the non ratification of the Convention by Rwanda could have accounted for the gap in response, and the capacity of the UNSC as first responders to act in the situation. We submit herein that Rwanda served as a reminder of UNSC collective failure to understand and act upon the 'warning signals' of genocide which are not single events but a set of it leading to the genocide. Whether Rwanda is of strategic importance or not, the UNSC owes humanity including those in Africa the collective responsibility to say 'Never Again' should we allow 'Holocaust or Genocide' of such proportion to happen in a civilized society.

We proceeded to evaluate the efficacy of the Military Staff Committee in relations to the Rwandan Genocide. Article 47 (1-3) averred that the Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the security council.

c) It was the contention of the study that Genocide like Holocaust was not a spontaneous action. It took years of planning, series of events which served as early warning signals could be drawn from it. Above all, a preliminary political sociological study of situations before deployment would have revealed the fault- lines or social cleavages. It would have disclose belligerents, hardliners or 'genocidaires' for early actions to contain them. An understanding such as this would have formed the basis of strategic deployment of Peace-Enforcement Corps to surround and perhaps restrict the movement and engagement of these two groups (aggressive and uncompromising groups) to activate the implementation of the Arusha Accord. The failure to assemble these critical strategic data led to the inability of the UNSC to activate the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It is now clear that the current operational code of the UNSC and the Department Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) need to be reviewed.

d) The policy of Anthropometry only served the interest of local politicians and to rigidify ethnicity. This was intentionally meant to void nation-building but enhance 'divide and rule'. This prepared the grounds for greater animosity and the eventual genocide. This policy was racist, and it created permanent gulf between the ethnic groups. It made the people to feel safe only within their ethnic cocoon. This must have been the latent manifest function of the policy, while the manifest function was to create ground for effective exploitation without resistance. When this action and the eventual action of Belgium during the genocide are juxtapose together, we can only draw inference that the people of Rwanda were betrayed by Belgium.

e) Another trajectory of the study was the evaluation of the mandate of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR I and II) and its adequacy in resolving a problem with long history of gestation. The series of crises between Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Government in Rwanda to allow African States intervention, led to the Arusha Accord in 1993. This was however at the behest of the UN. The

resolution established UNAMIR to help the parties implement the agreement, monitor its implementation and support the transitional Government(UN.R.872(1993). It consisted of 444 personnel out of which 179 were military observers. How could this number of soldiers cover the scope of the assignment? The intensity of the crises led to the increase of the soldiers and humanitarian officials to 5,500 (UN. R. 912 (1994) . It however, took six (6) months to assemble this number of soldiers without expanding the scope of the mission. It should be noted that within this timeline, the Aircraft of the Rwandan president had crashed in an airport fully guided by Hutu led army and the genocide had started full scale.

The clumsiness to assemble the soldiers and the weapons in the face of the carnage made the embassies of the member states of the UNSC who ought to have informed their principals of the dire situation and the urgency of action it deserves, made them guilty bystanders. UNAMIR I and II was small in number for the size of Rwanda, narrow in scope to implement the issues contained in the Arusha Accord, and faced with antiquated weaponry to enforce peace out of enmity that had festered since pre-colonial time. The cumulative effect of all these was the colossal betrayal of the Rwandan people by the UNSC, resulting in the avoidable genocide of unimaginable proportion.

### **Conclusion and Remedial Measures**

We must all recall the event which led to the establishment of the United Nations Organization (UNO) and commit ourselves to functionality of its ideals, irrespective of where it is happening. Crises, no matter which corner of the earth, it must be seen as a threat and capable of endangering global peace and given the attention and urgency it deserves to mitigate avoidable deaths. It is obvious that the current operational code of the UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operation (DPKO) is dysfunctional. If attention would be given to the region, continent or only states that pay their fees, it should be made known to all. We do know that preservation of human lives is the denominator. Consequent upon this, in order the issues of the 1948 Convention on the prevention crime of Genocide and threat to international peace, the UN should:

1. Conduct a political sociological study of every situation before committing boots on the ground. This would reveal the fault-lines based on religion, ethnicity, language, colonial legacies which constitute obstruction in the process of peace enforcement and keeping in every UN mission.
2. The study would indicate who are the ‘belligerents and the hardliners’ who should be policed more closely to allow any accord to be implemented.
3. The UN should know that in a conflict situation such as Rwanda, there was no peace to keep, rather an accord to enforce to bring-forth peace. We have to introduce the principles of peace enforcement and perhaps change the nomenclature for the Department of Peace Keeping Operations.
4. The Military Staff Council which is charged with advising the UN Security Council have onerous duty to obtain the political sociology of every conflict situation. This form the basis of strategic deployment of men and materials to enhance the effectiveness of the mission in every situation. It could create a research unit to aggregate the data for it.

The world must collectively say ‘never again’ would we allow Rwanda genocide repeat itself in the course of human history. Every life matters, the UNO should act swiftly in every

situation that had been brought to its attention in tandem with its cardinal objective of its charter.

The situation in which potential conflict situation are qualified as ‘strategic’ or non-strategic should not be a criteria for intervention. This is because every life matters, and the UNO is for everyone without strategic economic qualification. Every action of the UN would have saved many lives lost in the Rwandan Genocide.

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